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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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	1,	Fin		of the	Ingeni	eur	Kollektiv	of the Ch	nief De	epartments (Haup	otverwaltur	ngen
	,	a.	HV Fah	rzeug	bau had	had	three pr	oblems to s	solve.			
			1) Ex	cessi	ve capa	city	in railw	ay car fact	ories			
			2) Re	ducti	on of c	apac	eity throu	gh increase	ed out	out of trucks.	•	
			3) In	suffi	cient c	apac	city in ge	ar-whe el cu	itting	•		
		b,	capaci	ty.	The man	ufac	ture of s		was :	o increase prod involved, and no		
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		c.	HV All	geme i	ner Mas	chin	nenbau had	had five m	nain t	adice inscilled	Ц.	25X
per.	1							mical progr	cam.	h.i NR 70.2	TS S	{
			2) Tç	assi	st HV S	chwe	ermaschine	nbau overco	ome 11	difficulties.	By:	
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- 3) Increase of 400% in the textile machinery program. Large export orders were expected.
- 4) Rationalization of the production program.
- 5) Fusion of factories incapable of an independent existence.
- d. HV Elektrotechnik had had the following tasks:
 - 1) Adjustment of transformer manufacturing capacity to the expected demand.
 - 2) Adjustment of the electric motor manufacturing capacity to the expected demand. Reduction of the excessive production capacity for electric motors and increase in the insufficient production capacity for high frequency motors.
 - 3) Programs for measuring instruments, wireless equipment, and expansion of the "special program" ("Sonderprogramme" - possibly misprint for "Senderprogramme" - transmitter programs).

There would be an appreciable backlog carried forward to 1952, and it would be necessary for the "Kollektiv" to remain in existence in a modified form after the completion of its present tasks.

- e. HV Schiffbau had had the following tasks:
 - 1) Preparation of the program for the shipyards for 1952, and the broad program for the period up to 1955.
 - 2) Distribution of design tasks.
 - 3) Checking the plant and equipment of the shipyards.
 - 4) Co-ordination of supplies from the other Chief Departments.

The Reparations Program was known, but the customer had not yet clarified other salient points.

- f. HV Feinmechanik Optik had had the following tasks:
 - 1) Rationalization of the camera industry. Reduction of the number of different types from 24 to 13 basic types and two new types.
 - 2) Re-organization of the medical equipment industry.
 - 3) Improvement on the quality and production of scales.
 - 4) To overcome the insufficient capacity for production of the required number of lens systems in Carl Zeiss, Optik, Jena, VEB Zeiss demanded high precision which other factories could not meet.

2.	Reparations Deliveries: HV Schiffbau had fulfilled only 96.3%, whereas HVs	
	Schwermaschinenbau, Allgemeiner Maschinenbau and Fahrzeugbau had attained 100%	, and
	HV Feinmechanik/Optik had overfulfilled the plan. Work on the POBEDA was for	the
	first time behind schedule.	25X1

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